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Abstract: 
Paul Ricœur is rightly regarded as one of the greatest representants of the hermeneutical tradition, at the 
crossroads of epistemological filiation from Schleiermacher and Dilthey and the ontological filiation of 
Heidegger to Gadamer. Johann Michel's bias in this article is to explore a third way of hermeneutics under 
the guise of an interpretative anthropology. Before being a set of scholarly techniques (philological, legal, 
historical…) applied to specific fields (symbols, texts, actions…), hermeneutics derives originally from 
ordinary techniques of interpretation (unveiling, clarification…) at work in the world of life. The purpose of 
the contribution is to show how Ricoeur's hermeneutics can give serious directions for elaborating such an 
interpretive anthropology, in which case it also needs to be supplemented by other intellectual traditions to 
achieve this goal. 
Keywords: Hermeneutics, Anthropology, Self-technologies, Pragmatism, Schematism. 
Résumé: 
Paul Ricœur est considéré à juste titre comme l’un des plus grands représentants de la tradition 
herméneutique, au carrefour de la filiation épistémologique venant de Schleiermacher et Dilthey et de la 
filiation ontologique de Heidegger à Gadamer. Le parti pris de cet article est d’explorer une troisième voie 
de l’herméneutique sous le mode d’une anthropologie interprétative. Avant d’être un ensemble de 
techniques savantes (philologiques, juridiques, historiques…) appliquées à des champs spécifiques 
(symboles, textes, actions…), l’herméneutique dérive de manière originaire de technique ordinaires 
d’interprétations (dévoilement, explicitation, clarification…) à l’œuvre dans le monde de la vie. L’objectif de 
la contribution est de montrer en quoi l’herméneutique de Ricoeur peut donner des pistes sérieuses pour 
élaborer une telle anthropologie interprétative, en quoi également elle nécessite d’être complétée par 
d’autres traditions intellectuelles pour parvenir à cette fin. 
Mots-Clés: Herméneutique, anthropologie, technologies de soi, pragmatisme, schématisme.
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When Jerôme Porée and I edited the third series of Ecrits et conférences1 in 2013—of 
which David Pellauer’s English-language version has been published2—we wondered whether it 
really made sense to assimilate Paul Ricœur’s entire work to a kind of philosophical 
anthropology held together by a narrative thread, namely, an attempt to answer Kant’s famous 
question: What is man? For one thing, the term “anthropology” is not part of Ricœur’s core 
lexicon; it never features in the titles of his books, and only very rarely in the actual title of his 
essays, with the notable exception of a conference paper delivered in Milan in 1960 bearing the 
evocative title: “The Antinomy of Human Reality and the Problem of Philosophical 
Anthropology.” It is in the first part of his work, and particularly in the second volume of his 
Philosophy of the Will,3 that the notion of anthropology is more visible and more overtly used, 
with a very Kantian slant. Admittedly, however, in the rest of his work, the notion itself is largely 
absent from his dominant conceptual framework. And yet for all the radical evolutions and 
variations in his thinking, Ricœur’s entire oeuvre seems to be drawn like a magnet to this 
question, this recurrent theme. The will, fallibility, language, symbols, texts, memory, history, 
recognition, imagination—to cite only a few examples—are all, in one way or another, part of a 
process of thinking about the human condition. Not for nothing does Ricœur, in his intellectual 
autobiography, look back on his life’s work as a “project of philosophical anthropology.”4 A 
philosophical anthropology, which—needless to add—is in constant dialogue with the human 
sciences. But whereas the latter have a tendency to disperse into so many specialized disciplines, 
philosophy has the task of rethinking what it is to be human in all of its underlying unity. 
Ricœur’s anthropology could therefore be described as direct when it is overt and 
consciously conceived of as such (notably in the first part of his work) and as indirect when all of 
the problems and themes that it touches upon converge, at least implicitly, on an examination of 
the multiple facets of the human condition. 
If I want to reopen this discussion today, it is so that it can be extended and refined, as 
well as probed in greater depth. The question that motivates me is this: in what way and to what 
extent can Ricœur’s anthropology be described as hermeneutic or interpretive? What part does 
interpretation play in his description of mankind? I will try to address this in two stages. First, I 
will try to show that while Ricœur’s philosophy offers precious insights into what an 
anthropology of Homo interpretans—the self-reflective human being—might look like, these 
insights are only partly hermeneutic. Second, I intend to pursue, and also begin to systematize, 
the path opened up by Ricœur to sketch the outlines of an analysis of Homo interpretans. 
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Constructing an interpretive anthropology derived from Ricœur 
There are different ways of looking at interpretation: from a methodological and 
epistemological perspective (the place of interpretation in the human sciences, and even in the 
natural sciences, when it comes to descriptive or explanatory methods), from an ontological 
perspective (the place of interpretation in understanding the meaning of existence), or from an 
anthropological perspective (the place of interpretation in the ordinary activities of the everyday 
world). The first perspective generally belongs to a philosophical tradition associated with 
methodological hermeneutics, from Schleiermacher to Dilthey: the aim being to ground the 
humanities on a firm foundation of understanding, as a counterpoint to the natural sciences. We 
know just how seminal a role Ricœur played in a tradition that he, more than any other 
contemporary philosopher, helped to renew by contrasting it with the ontological hermeneutics 
inaugurated by Heidegger and continued by Gadamer. It is not this first perspective, nor the 
second, that I want to address here today, but the third, which centers specifically on a social and 
philosophical anthropology of man as an interpreting being. 
 If we refer to Ricœur’s first published works—say, up to the first volume of his 
philosophy of the will—we would have a hard time to characterize his thought as a “direct 
anthropology,” let alone as “interpretive anthropology.” The dominant matrix of his work was 
still strongly attracted to phenomenology, enriched by the existentialist heritage of Marcel and 
Jaspers. The anthropological motif was even less direct in that Husserlian phenomenology (used 
as the core method in the development of the philosophy of the will), despite being centered on 
the phenomenon of intentionality, does not step across the line into the examination of the 
human condition. It took the daring of a Hans Blumenberg to clearly open an anthropological 
window onto the phenomenological project.5 But even though there is no direct anthropology in 
Ricœur’s early phenomenology, there is most certainly an indirect anthropology, covering the 
whole area of the human will, especially when the philosopher leaves behind the terrain of the 
pure description of volition to venture—before even the end of the first volume—into the realm 
of the absolute involuntary, of consent, and of hope: the contours of human finitude are already 
visible. 
 It is in the second volume of the Philosophy of the Will, Finitude and Guilt, that we find a 
decisive double shift. The first shift comes in the opening book of the volume—Fallible Man—
where Ricœur clearly takes an anthropological perspective focused precisely on finitude: on 
man’s “disproportion of the self to itself,” which makes moral error possible. The philosopher 
lays the foundations both of an anthropology of vulnerability (Human being torn between his 
own finitude and his aspiration to the infinite, between the limitations of this own character and 
the prospect of happiness) and of human fallibility (the possibility of moral error). This 
anthropology of vulnerability would remain present, to varying degrees, from one end of 
Ricœur’s work to the other, at least up until Oneself as Another, which developed an anthropology 
of capability (speaking, acting, narrating, assuming responsibility) that speaks directly to the 
incapacities that constitute the human condition. 
The second shift, introduced by the second volume of the Philosophy of the Will, lies in the 
hermeneutic turn taken by Ricœur’s anthropology. And not only, in this case, from the 
methodological and epistemological perspective, which concerns the way in which knowledge, 
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exegesis or the science of religion relate to myths and symbols—although this is, of course, 
central to Ricœur’s first major hermeneutic system. What is of greater interest to us here is that 
this hermeneutic also leaves room for an anthropology of human being as an interpreting being, 
as an ordinary person faced with symbols and signs with double meanings (stain, sin, guilt). The 
scope of Ricœur’s interpretive anthropology is beyond the resources of a pure hermeneutic 
approach. Ricœur highlights an ordinary technique of interpretation—though it is also found at a 
more elaborate level in the field of religious studies and philosophy—namely the capacity for 
symbolization, and for unveiling the meanings in polysemic signs. 
I refer to these ordinary techniques of interpretation as ethnointerpretations or 
interpretatials, halfway between Kant’s transcendantals and Heidegger’s existentials. In one 
sense, interpretatials are like ways of being-in-a-situation or ways of interacting from which 
understanding develops, but whose scope cannot be reduced to the meanings of being, facticity, 
or finitude contained in Dasein. In another sense, interpretatials are like conditions of possibility 
of knowledge, like prerequisites for the mediated understanding of any problematic sign, but 
whose constituent parts cannot be reduced to any scientific knowledge (which is, after all, a 
derivative and sophisticated form of knowledge). In other words, interpretatials are the ways of 
being and forms of ordinary knowledge that constitute any mediated understanding of a set of 
problematic signs. 
 Ricœur extends the scope of these particular modalities of interpretation—
symbolization and unveiling (dévoilement)—by revealing other structures of signs with dual 
meanings, in his later discussions with structuralism, and even more so with psychoanalysis. The 
output of the unconscious is expressed in symbols, the paradigmatic form being, of course, 
dreams, whose latent meaning can only be unencrypted by trying to interpret the manifest 
meaning (the day’s residues). At this level, Ricœur is undeniably talking about sophisticated 
interpretation techniques, more specifically those encountered in Freudian metapsychology. 
Ricœur’s problem is mainly an epistemological one, in as much as he is seeking to recruit the 
psychoanalytic method into the fold of a hermeneutics derived from the exegetic sciences. But the 
psychoanalyst, after all, though he lays claim to a knowledge that the analysand does not possess, 
does not have a monopoly on the interpretation of dreams. By which I mean that the first 
interpreter of dreams is the analysand himself, who attempts, with varying degrees of success, to 
bring some order and legibility (if that is what he wants) to the confused, scrambled paratext of 
the day’s residues. Without himself being an analysand, i.e. without necessarily lying on the 
analyst’s couch, the ordinary subject can perfectly well draw on ordinary unveiling techniques to 
decode the productions of his own unconscious; just how truthful they may or may not be is not 
relevant here. 
 One can adopt a similar reading strategy when it comes to the proposal to extend 
hermeneutics to longer sequences than symbols, namely to actual texts. Although Ricœur is heir 
to the long hermeneutic tradition that grew out of the textual sciences, going back to 
Schleiermacher, it was really the encounter with Gadamer that gave decisive impetus to the later 
version of his theory of interpretation. Of course, it was mainly within a specific methodological 
and epistemological framework that Ricœur sought to add a new stone to the edifice of textual 
hermeneutics, that of professional and scholarly techniques, which owe as much to philology as 
they do to structuralism. But his philosophy, via that of Gadamer, cuts an anthropological furrow 
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through the place attributed to the application or refiguration of the text relative to the reader. 
Because the reader of a text, be it history or fiction, is not only the professional reader—the 
philologist, the literary critic or the philosopher—but any subject who can read and grasp the 
meaning of a text, even if there are, of course, sophisticated techniques—for example philological 
(grammatical and psychological) or structuralist (correlations between functions, roles, characters 
in a story)—for explaining a text. 
However, if the refiguration of the world of the text onto the world-model of the reader 
reaches beyond the professional reader to include all readers, then the methodological 
hermeneutics of textual analysis clearly leads to an interpretive anthropology (at least for 
societies with writing; it might be worth thinking about extending the concept of refiguration to 
media other than texts: to pictograms, for example, or painting, or music, and so on). The key 
factor, in my view, being that the lay reader also mobilizes a whole gamut of interpretative 
techniques (including the movement of understanding from the whole to the part and back to the 
whole) when confronted with an inability to understand a section of text, with an obscure or 
puzzling passage, with difficulty in following a plot or identifying a character in a story. Once 
again, there is no guarantee that these techniques do actually make the meaning of a text any less 
problematic or enable the reader to “get at the truth” of it: anthropologically speaking, the 
important thing is to be able to identify the ordinary techniques that individuals, societies and 
cultures draw upon when they are faced with an impediment to understanding. 
 One might also grant the existence of a third reading strategy when Ricœur proposes 
to extend hermeneutics to the world of action. Admittedly, it is again within the framework of a 
particular epistemology that Ricœur seeks, in From Text to Action,6 to transpose the model of the 
text to the social sciences, by considering deliberate action as a text to be interpreted. Action—
rendered autonomous, like a text, from the author’s intentions—becomes an open book that can 
be appropriated, refigured and transformed. But this epistemological issue, which concerns the 
methodological foundations of the social sciences, can lead on to a genuinely anthropological 
issue. This happens when social agents are confronted, in the course of ordinary interactions, 
with situations that are atypical, unfamiliar, or disturbed: the meaning of the action is no longer 
self-evident. Social agents, when they can, will then apply interpretive techniques to restore 
order, coherence, and legibility to the world of action: for example, by asking for clarification 
from their interlocutor or interactant about what they meant by their action, or by placing an 
action that is hard to comprehend within a wider context, a history of past practice. It is here that 
we see Homo interpretans at work in his ordinary activities, at least when these activities come 
up against obstacles to immediate understanding. 
 Ricœur’s philosophy may also offer a final pathway toward an interpretive 
anthropology in the form of what he calls the hermeneutics of the self, introduced mainly in 
Oneself As Another.7 Once again, the hermeneutics of the self—defined as the subject’s reflexive 
and interpretive ability, half way between Descartes’ “exalted cogito” and Nietzsche’s 
“humiliated cogito”—is a form of self-technology, to use Foucault’s term, practiced by those 
professionals of interpretation, the philosophers. The hermeneutics of the self belongs to a 
twofold practice (self-concern and self-knowledge) whose historical origins, as Foucault showed,8 
can be traced back to technologies of the self that are Hellenistic as well as Christian (notably 
through the verbalization of confession). From this angle, these technologies are historically 
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esoteric, learned in particular institutions (schools of philosophy, monastic communities, etc.) and 
intended for an initiated audience. It is possible, however, to extend the hermeneutics of the self 
to any practice by ordinary individuals who indulge in lay self-interpretation in one form or 
another, especially if, like Charles Taylor, we adopt the anthropological standpoint, viewing 
“man as a self-interpreting animal.” Philosophers and penitent monks, in other words, do not 
have a monopoly on the hermeneutics of the self. And it is the task of interpretive anthropology 
to characterize the range of self-interpretations that ordinary agents use when confronted with 
the issues that surround the meaning of their existence, particularly when faced with a set of 
discordant events, such as biographical events, which permanently affect a life that can no longer 
be taken for granted. Stories, in particular—as ways of embedding oneself in a narrative—can 
serve as valuable interpretive technologies for restoring self-continuity where the event generates 
disruption, dissonance, or dissolution of the self. 
 Ricœur’s hermeneutics provides useful resources (the hermeneutics of symbols, the 
hermeneutics of texts, the hermeneutics of action, the hermeneutics of the self) for developing an 
interpretive anthropology, but a certain reading—and therefore a certain degree of 
interpretation—is required to make it into a gateway for easier access to such an anthropology. In 
other words, while there certainly is an anthropology (whether direct or indirect) in Ricœur’s 
work, it is not entirely and immediately interpretive when one considers his published writings 
as a whole. And even if one can discern an interpretive anthropology, it sometimes suffers from 
being too closely pegged to the model of the text, and more generally to permanently fixed 
expressions of life, whereas an interpretive anthropology also needs to be attentive to 
problematic, unfamiliar action in the making, as revealed to us in all its event-driven, indexical 
glory. An anthropology of Homo interpretans additionally presupposes a more systematic 
treatment of historic, cultural and social conditions—as well as variations—that have brought 
Homo interpretans about. I would like, at this point, to begin to trace that path by taking 
Ricœur’s initiative further. 
Homo interpretans: between the universal and the particular 
The project of an interpretive anthropology requires that we look in two directions. On 
the one side, at the universal and invariable conditions of interpretation without which the 
concept of Homo interpretans would lose all relevance. This is where philosophy is at its most 
pertinent. On the other, at the particular (historic, social, cultural) conditions under which 
interpretive activity is manifested. This is where the social sciences come into their own. 
Let’s start by reminding ourselves that interpretation refers to a mode of understanding 
in which the intended object is relatively indeterminate (an image, a text, a trace, an action, a sign, 
a situation), but it always has to do with an understanding that resists any immediate grasping of 
meaning. Interpretation is a mediate or mediated understanding where the meaning does not 
spontaneously make itself intelligible. Interpretation—and this is what gives it its reflexive, 
suspensive dimension—then takes the form of a search or an inquiry. Under these conditions, 
interpretation is indeed peculiar to mankind—which is not to equate the animal world with mere 
machines—even if human beings, as they go about their business, are not constantly interpreting 
everything just because they happen to be semiotic animals that dwell in a world of meaning and 
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symbols. As Wittgenstein said, we interpret things only when we do not understand them. Of 
course, there is no clear dividing line between immediate understanding and mediated or 
interpretive understanding: there are plenty of gray areas between the clear and the unclear, the 
obvious and the obscure, the familiar and the foreign, the straightforward and the problematic. 
Talking about universal and invariable conditions of interpretation brings us back to 
what I have called interpretatials or ethnointerpretations, as ordinary ways of being and ordinary 
modes of knowledge when faced with situations where meaning is problematic. An 
anthropology of Homo interpretans, such as the one I am proposing, tells us about the ordinary 
techniques used by men and women to cope with the opacity of the signifying world. They 
employ these ordinary methods (asking for clarification, putting things in context, placing them 
within a narrative) to dispel the obscurity. I use the term ethnointerpretations to qualify the type 
of ordinary interpretive techniques employed to cope with unfamiliar, atypical situations (as 
opposed to typical ways of doing things—often the preferred focus of the ethnomethodology that 
emerged from the sociology of Garfinkel—in situations that have themselves become routine). By 
way of example, let me list a few of the ethnointerpretations that we all use in our day-to-day 
lives: 
The technique of clarification consists in shedding light on a meaning that was initially 
fuzzy, murky, or confused. Some philosophers, notably Wittgenstein, might profess that the goal 
of philosophy is to clarify thought or language, but it’s fair to say that clarification—which is 
never guaranteed to succeed—also functions as an ethnomethod when we are looking to piece 
together the syntax of a manifestly ill-formed, and therefore meaningless, sentence, or when we 
try to reconstruct the meaning of an incoherent argument, or strive to redefine an initially 
bewildering situation of interaction (Who did what? Why? In what circumstances? etc.); 
Simplification, in its positive sense, aims to break down, into meaningful elements, a set 
of propositions, a theoretical or practical problem, a narrative plot, or a situation so complex as to 
make spontaneous comprehension difficult. Problematicity, in this case, is linked not to a lack of 
meaning, but to a profusion of relations between signifying elements; 
Explicitation is a form of ethnointerpretation that seeks to uncover a meaning assumed 
to be contained in an expression or proposition. It is found everywhere in ordinary practice when 
light needs to be thrown on the unspoken implications of a proposition, an intention, or a 
situation where the meaning could give rise to ambiguity or misunderstanding; 
The technique of unveiling consists in exposing, behind the literal or manifest meaning, 
another meaning which is, voluntarily or involuntarily, hidden, latent, or prefigured. The masters 
of suspicion elevated it to a fully-fledged scientific method, in which interpretation is necessary 
because the manifest meaning is seen as illusory; the real meaning has to be uncovered on each 
occasion. Similar procedures can be found—with no such scientific or philosophical 
pretensions—in ordinary interpretations: unmasking the deception of an outwardly sincere 
attitude, hidden intentions, the hypocrisy of a decision that claims to be fair, or the demagogic 
ulterior motives of a seemingly generous political speech; 
Symbolization pursues a very different end to that of unveiling, although the 
approach—uncovering the hidden meaning behind a manifest meaning—is much the same. But 
instead of deconstructing a meaning that is assumed to be illusory or deliberately mystifying in 
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order to get at the real (contrasting) meaning, symbolization unpackages the surplus of meaning 
contained within the literal meaning of an expression, or of a symbol, a myth, a situation. This 
interpretive technique has proved its heuristic value, notably in religious hermeneutics, in the 
exegesis of sacred texts that Ricœur includes under the hermeneutics of reconstruction (as 
opposed to the hermeneutics of suspicion). This form of ethnointerpretation is found in most 
societies, in the popular exegesis of stories, songs, legends, and myths, for children or for adults, 
during religious rituals, wakes, public readings, and so on; 
Contextualization is perhaps the form of ethnointerpretation most frequently employed 
both in the academic world and the ordinary world. It is used to address a partial lack of 
meaning, a gap in meaning, a truncated meaning. It does so by replacing the meaning of a 
proposition, or the grammar of an artwork, in an appropriate context, i.e. in a broader or more 
relevant configuration of signification. 
To speak of a suspensive or reflexive attitude of meaning with regard to interpretation 
does not mean we are giving free rein to a kind of sovereign consciousness, at liberty to interpret 
a text or problematic situation as it chooses. There are, in other words, historic, social and cultural 
conditions on individual interpretation just as there are on the collective process of interpretation, 
our interpreting together. 
Reading Jan Patočka’s Heretical Essays9 we are, to begin with, invited to think about the 
historical conditions of interpretation. The Czech phenomenologist’s concise, dense writing 
provides a useful framework for thinking about the “problematicity of meaning,” in the telling 
phrase that he coined. The heart of the philosopher’s approach lies in the slant he gives to the 
Husserlian thesis of the natural world, which is no longer simply assimilated to the pre-scientific 
world (as is the case in Krisis) but to the prehistoric world, in a specific sense, far removed from 
the historiographical notion of prehistory. Paradoxically, the prehistoric world, as envisaged by 
Patočka, is not bereft of myths, stories and histories. Quite the contrary: these narrative forms 
serve to keep mankind within the prehistoric, i.e. within a life-sustaining social cycle, 
transmitting and receiving worlds of meaning that are never really questioned. The prehistoric 
world, as a natural world, is fundamentally a “non-problematic” world: “life simply as it is 
contained in the self-evidence of received meaning, in the traditional way of life, its forms and 
modes.”10 
While this description offers a powerful illustration of the process by which meaning is 
naturalized, it could be reproached for its underlying historicism, evident in the way the historic 
world as such is defined. With perfect consistency, the historic world is characterized by the 
“problematicity of meaning”: history begins when Man stops accepting the meaning transmitted 
by tradition; history begins when, as meaning is denaturalized, Man goes in quest of new 
meaning; history begins, ultimately, when Man starts interpreting. For Patočka, in other words, 
interpretation, in the strictest sense, is by no means an anthropological universal disposition—
merely a contingent historical possibility. 
 The proof is that history, for Patočka, only really begins with Greek civilization, which 
suspends and challenges the political, cosmological and natural order. It is with the Greeks that 
the great denaturalization of meaning takes root. Such is the legacy of the “problematicity of 
meaning” at the very foundations of European civilization. By contrast, other civilizations (if we 
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can still call them that)—those that preceded “the Greek miracle” or have not yet been directly 
influenced by its aura—are relegated to the prehistoric world. 
Without disputing the existence of the “Greek miracle,” it is surely a safe bet that 
Patočka’s eurocentrism would not stand up to more detailed research on the historical 
anthropology of non-European civilizations. The confusion stems, in fact, from the status 
accorded to the “problematicity of meaning” correlated with the historic world. When Patočka 
describes the world as problematic, he has in mind a meaning that is more philosophical than 
anthropological, and in a register that is more meta-interpretive than interpretive. The 
problematicity of meaning, from the philosopher’s perspective, concerns the totality of being, i.e. 
“the whole of existence.” 
And yet the notion of the problematicity of meaning can be given a much broader 
conceptual status: an anthropological and social status. In this context, the problematicity of 
meaning as expressed by Patočka is just one variant of interpretation, and a radicalized one at 
that, not only because it concerns the whole of being, but because it is presented in a 
philosophical mode, i.e. in a meta-interpretive register. The problematicity of meaning takes on a 
much wider scope, however, if it is seen as an ordinary human activity when people are 
confronted with anything that disrupts the orderly flow of the immediate understanding of 
meaning, without precluding the possibility of questioning. The notion of problematicity of 
meaning can then be decontextualized from the framework of the philosophy of history, in which 
Patočka was still working, and recontextualized into the framework of the sociology and 
anthropology of ordinary activities.11 We can then speak of an ordinary epoché—which is not that 
of the phenomenologists, and does not have the same ambition—when subjects suspend their 
judgment about whether the meaning of a behavior, a situation, or an utterance is “natural,” in so 
far as that meaning has ceased to be self-evident. 
The expression “prehistoric world” can then be replaced by “ordinary epoché” or by G. 
H. Mead’s “immediate experience.”12 Mead uses the term immediate experience to refer to a 
relationship with the world that proceeds without problems, without conflicts, without tensions, 
when the responses of social agents are adapted to the situations in their environment. But when 
unprecedented events occur in “the world that is there,” when the environment undergoes 
changes, when elements of doubt or uncertainty creep in, immediate responses are not enough. A 
certain attitude is required, which Mead calls cognitive thought and Dewey calls inquiry, if we 
are to adjust our responses to a new environment, and reassure ourselves about the existence of 
objects and about the value and meaning of things. 
This interpretive process is dual-faceted: one facet is a form of undergoing, where a social 
agent experiences a “disruption,” in Dewey’s sense, of its immediate understanding of the 
meaning of just such a denaturalized situation—in other words, the suspensive and reflexive 
attitude—the other facet is a form of doing, or “inquiry,” when agents go in search of a new 
meaning better suited to the understanding of a situation, when they try to establish new 
relations of meaning between strange or unknown phenomena, or when they resolve ambiguities 
about the meaning of a text or conversation. There is no way of knowing when, if ever, this 
circling around meaning will come to an end, given that any new occurrence of a strange and 
discordant meaning is liable to once again trigger the process of inquiry, and set people off once 
more on the interpretive journey in order to adjust their responses to the environment. 
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In this pragmatist context, the hypothesis of the universality of Homo interpretans can be 
defended. In other words, whatever culture or civilization they belong to, people can experience 
the strangeness of the proffered meaning (of an action, utterance, text, etc.), without necessarily 
having to question (scientifically or philosophically) the whole of existence, or the general order 
of things. Even in what Patočka would call “prehistoric” societies, traditions of meaning are 
never received passively; they are interpreted so as to re-inscribe them in the next generation, to 
compare and contrast them with other traditions of meaning, or to cope with upheavals in the 
cycles of life. The symbolic worlds of human societies are never entirely fixed and intemporal, 
even in the societies that least resemble our own. In this respect, Greek civilization clearly 
invented an entirely new way of questioning meaning, in the form of the reflective suspension of 
all signifying orders. 
This framework, inspired by pragmatism (a tradition with which Ricœur had little 
contact, despite the central role it played at the University of Chicago, mainly through the figure 
of Mead), represents a valuable resource for channeling our thoughts about the ordinary 
mechanisms of self-interpretation, but it is insufficient for thinking about the cultural conditions 
that govern the act of interpreting, whether performed by individuals or by groups. The detour 
via social and cultural anthropology is, a useful relay for highlighting both the diversity of 
symbolic systems and the universality of Homo interpretans. Despite all the individual 
variations, it would be a mistake to see interpretation as being free from all constraints and 
predispositions. Indeed, nothing could be further from the truth. Cultural anthropology teaches 
us just how important are the symbolic frameworks, forms and structures by which we give 
meaning to the world, to others and to ourselves. It makes sense, then, to start out from the 
Kantian legacy of schematism, revisited both by the philosophy of symbolic forms, initiated by 
Cassirer, and by an anthropological tradition that runs from Levi-Strauss to Descola, via 
Bourdieu. 
The whole point of using the idea of schematism in structural anthropology is to 
extrapolate the schema as a representation of a class of situations, a representation that enables 
subjects to act in an orderly way whenever they are faced with analogous situations. Like 
Durkheim before him, Levi-Strauss sought to “sociologize” the Kantian schemata, while 
maintaining the idea that such an operation remains an “art hidden in the depths of the human 
soul.” Levi-Strauss pushes this perspective to its logical conclusion by locating schematism in the 
structural unconscious, along with the elementary structures of kinship which, like a system of 
linguistic signs, cannot be modified without redefining a whole set of oppositions. 
This finally brings us back to the realm of the “savage mind (pensée sauvage)” and to its 
hypothetical universality. For Levi-Strauss, recognizing the cultural diversity of symbolic systems 
is not incompatible with the existence of a fundamental structure of the human mind. These 
partly innate dispositions can best be assimilated to the receptor structures or “structures 
d’accueil” (the term used by the biologist François Jacob), which enable the child to react to 
stimuli from its environment. These receptor structures, as potential schemas of practice, can only 
be filled, enriched and oriented through contact with the symbolic systems in place in each 
individual society. 
Certain schemas of practice have a longer learning curve, due to the quantity of 
information that needs to be processed and ordered. The practice of hunting among the Achuar 
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of the Ecuadorian Amazon offers a good example, in as much as men over forty statistically bring 
back more game. And yet Descola observes that the adolescents already have an admirable 
degree of know-how and a highly trained eye (being able to identify several hundred types of 
animal, to imitate their calls, and to describe their habitat). However, it will be another twenty or 
so years before they bring back game from every hunt. 
Following Descola, one can distinguish between cognitive schemas that are assumed to 
be natural and universal, and cognitive schemas that are acquired through contact with cultural 
systems. Among the former—although this continues to be debated among biologists and 
psychologists—one would include schemas covering expectations about human actions 
(ascribing intentions to others), covering the mode of being of physical objects, and covering the 
nature of non-human organisms. Anthropology, however, focuses on collective schemas that 
serve to construct culturally shared meanings: “first, to structure the flow of perception in a 
selective fashion, granting a preeminence in signification to particular traits and processes that 
can be observed in the environment; second, to organize both practical activity and the 
expression of thoughts and emotions in accordance with relatively standardized scenarios; and 
third, to provide a framework for typical interpretations of patterns of behavior and events—
interpretations that are acceptable and can be communicated within a community in which the 
habits of life that they convey are regarded as normal.”13 
What does this use of the idea of schematism—revisited by structural anthropology—
teach us about interpretive activity? Cultural schematism principally comes into play in any form 
of immediate understanding of symbolic or natural worlds: cultural schemas define the 
frameworks by which we identify ourselves, connect ourselves, categorize ourselves, classify 
ourselves, and make clear to ourselves the distinctions between natural beings, social beings, and 
artificial objects. This isn't the place to discuss the systems of ontological classification based on 
cultural areas that Descola proposes; simply take the example of Achuar totemism, of which 
Descola has intimate knowledge, and where animals are classified by human attributes and by 
their degree of proximity to the human way of life. Cultural schematism can be seen at work, for 
example, in the way Achuar women see garden plants as children that need to be guided to 
maturity, while the men see each animal they hunt as a brother-in-law, “an unstable and tricky 
relationship that demands mutual respect and circumspection.”14 
When cultural schematism operates in ordinary, non-problematic situations, it is indeed 
a meaning-giving activity, but one that we might call proto-interpretive or pre-interpretive. This 
is the case with the collective schemas that Descola rightly calls “non-reflexive,” which can be 
compared to Charles Taylor’s sensorimotor level of proto-interpretation, to Levi-Strauss’s pre-
interpretive, pre-propositional level of classification systems in Pensée sauvage and to Bourdieu’s 
bodily knowledge, practical sense or habitus, i.e. embodied know-how, and the informed eye of 
savoir-voir. 
When, however, individuals and groups are faced with distortions of meaning, and with 
the failure of their typical responses to the social or natural environment, a genuinely interpretive 
activity is required in order to restore continuity of meaning, resolve ambiguities, and resituate 
an event inside a symbolic system. Cultural schemas come into play at this reflexive level of 
interpretation. There are schematically cultural ways of dealing with the problematicity of 
meaning. When we are faced with micro-distortions of meaning, the interpretive schemas that 
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already exist—by which I mean the typical ways of responding to problematic situations—are 
enough to restore continuity of meaning within a system of signifiers. In this case, the schematic 
operation is akin to Kant’s “determinative judgment” in that it subsumes the disruptive event 
(such as tracks left by an animal that do not have the usual characteristics of tracks left by an 
animal of the same category, or a painting attributed to a master that differs from his usual style) 
into a pre-existing schema. These micro-distortions of ordinary meaning have no impact on the 
relative homology between, on the one hand, existing schemas and mental structures and, on the 
other, cultural systems and natural orders. All it takes is a “makeshift” interpretation—a spot of 
interpretive “bricolage”—to integrate and recombine the events coherently into symbolic systems 
that ultimately undergo only minor modifications. 
It is a very different configuration when societies are faced with a “problematicity of 
meaning” so extreme that it is totally incommensurate with pre-existing cultural schemas. For 
example: serious disruption of ecosystems; continual wars; political, economic and cultural 
revolutions; colonial invasions; culture clashes. What we find here is a significant disconnect 
between the existing schemas and the new world order, a disconnect that reflects the sudden 
powerlessness of determinative judgment and the usual interpretation procedures. In the worst-
case scenarios, the gap between schemas and worlds can persist, expand, and trigger the collapse 
of the interpretive process, or even the progressive destruction of cultural universes, as we have 
seen with so many animist or totemic societies, powerless to generate renewed meaning given the 
sheer magnitude of the disruptions affecting them. Especially, as Levi-Strauss demonstrated, in 
the case of societies whose predominantly synchronic structures are more sensitive to events. 
In more favorable scenarios, by contrast, one can observe new schemas being invented in 
order to overcome a problematicity of meaning of unprecedented intensity—an operation rather 
like the role played by the imagination in “reflective judgment.” This invention may take the path 
of a brand new combination of existing schemas, or of the translation and transposition of 
existing schemas into other cultural worlds in order to construct new schemas capable of 
adapting to new configurations of the world and of nature. Such is the magnitude of these 
changes of meaning that single individuals are incapable of producing new cultural schemas on 
their own; these schemas are, by nature, collective. Such, indeed, is the magnitude of these 
changes of meaning that is not any one particular cultural schema that proves to be unsuited: it is 
the whole range of schematic structures that make up a cultural universe. For example, the 
imposition and penetration of naturalism in the totemic world, via colonization, means that—in 
these societies—the non-human can no longer even be seen as the psychic and social continuity of 
the human. Here we are not far (were it not for his Eurocentric bias) from the narrower sense that 
Patočka gives to the problematicity of meaning, when the entire political, social and natural order 
is suspended and brought into question. In such historically rare cases, interpretation emerges in 
its most reflective form. 
When it is not defeated by the sheer magnitude of the collapse of meaning, when it 
manages to invent new schemas and to reconfigure cultural worlds of meaning in new ways, 
interpretation also serves to give them a history. A history that is not just that of everyday 
accidents in which the diachronic has only a minor impact on the synchronic, but another history, 
in which the destabilizing power of the diachronic totally subverts the coherence of the 
synchronic, reconfiguring it into a new symbolic structure. That is the one of the lessons to be 
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learned from an anthropology of Homo interpretans, halfway between the universal and the 
particular, in a still exploratory line of enquiry for which Ricœur’s philosophy offers us—in more 
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